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INTRODUCTION
The unprecedented rise in the number of people held in U.S. jails
and prisons has garnered considerable attention from policy makers, activ-
ists, and academics alike. Signaled in part by Michelle Alexander’s New
York Times bestseller, The New Jim Crow, and the unlikely coalition of ac-
tivists, policy makers, celebrities, and business leaders on both sides of the
political aisle who have pledged to end mass incarceration in our lifetime,
the prison system has returned to public policy discourse in a way that was
unforeseen less than a decade ago. On any given day in 2014, just over 2.3
million people were held in U.S. jails and prisons.1 This figure represents a
tenfold increase in the inmate census since 1973, and about 22 percent of
the world’s prisoner population.2 Unfortunately, while the causes and
consequences of mass incarceration warrant rigorous examination, the fo-
cus on arrest and imprisonment has left a curious, yet equally historic phe-
* Reuben Jonathan Miller, PhD is an Assistant Professor of Social Work, Faculty
Associate in the Population Studies Center, and Faculty Affiliate in the Department of
Afroamerican and African Studies at the University of Michigan and a member of the Institute
for Advanced Study in Princeton, N.J. (2016).
** Amanda Alexander, JD/PhD is an Assistant Professor of Afroamerican and African
Studies at the University of Michigan, a postdoctoral scholar at Michigan Law School, and a
member of the Michigan Society of Fellows.
The authors would like to thank Christianna Kyriacou and the review and editorial team
at the Michigan Journal of Race & Law.
1. Danielle Kaeble, Lauren Glaze, Anastasios Tsoutis & Todd Minton, Correctional Popu-
lations in the United States, 2014, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, at Table 1 (rev. ed. Jan. 21,
2016), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus14.pdf.
2. See THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 36 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Redburn eds., 2014);
see also Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUD. 36 (2013),
http://www.apcca.org/uploads/10th_Edition_2013.pdf.
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nomenon hidden in plain sight—the rise of a supervised society, and with
it, an alternate track of citizenship.
More than 600,000 people are released from prison each year.3 They
join the 4.7 million Americans living in their home communities who are
supervised through probation or parole services.4 These former prisoners
are subject to re-arrest and re-incarceration should they violate a condition
of their release.5 These technical violations accounted for 26 percent of all
prison admissions in 2014,6 and included failure to report to one’s proba-
tion or parole officer, leaving the state for any reason without permission,
submitting a positive urine test for drugs or alcohol, missing an appoint-
ment at a social service agency, owning a firearm, and associating with
known offenders—a difficult task given the high U.S. incarceration rate
and the concentration of former prisoners in poor urban communities.7
Notwithstanding the sheer number of former prisoners supervised in
their home communities, or the restraints imposed by criminal records on
their social and geographic mobility,8 to capture the scope and conse-
quence of carceral expansion, one must widen his or her lens. Changing
the unit of analysis from a point-in-time count to the number of people
annually admitted and discharged from penal institutions reveals the more
than 11 million people annually processed through the nation’s more than
3,000 county jail facilities.9 A staggering 19.8 million people are estimated
to have a felony conviction,10 and up to 100 million U.S. residents may
3. Peter Wagner & Leah Sakala, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie, A PRISON POL’Y INI-
TIATIVE (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie.html.
4. See Danielle Kaeble, Laura M. Maruschak & Thomas P. Bonczar, Probation and Parole
in the United States, 2014, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 1 (Nov. 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/ppus14.pdf.
5. See Ryken Grattet, Joan Petersilia, Jeffrey Lin & Marlene Beckman, Parole Violations
and Revocations in California: Analysis and Suggestions for Action, 73 FED. PROBATION 2, 4 (2009);
Jonah Aaron Siegel, Prisoner Reentry, Parole Violations, and the Persistence of the Surveillance State 2-4
(Oct. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with the National
Criminal Justice Reference Service); see also EDWARD J. LATESSA & PAULA SMITH, CORREC-
TIONS IN THE COMMUNITY (4th ed. 2007).
6. See E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2014, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 10 (Sept. 2015), http://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf.
7. See Robert J. Sampson & Charles Lloeffler, Punishment’s Place: The Local Concentration
of Mass Incarceration, 139 DEADALUS 20 (2010); see also Paul Street, Race, Prison, and Poverty: The
Race to Incarcerate in an Age of Correctional Keynesianism, HISTORY IS A WEAPON (2003), http://
www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/streeracpripov.html.
8. See Jeffrey Morenoff & David Harding, Incarceration, Prisoner Reentry, and Communities,
40 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 411 (2014).
9. Todd D. Minton & Zhen Zheng, Jail Inmates at Midyear 2014: Statistical Tables, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE 8-10 (June 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf.
10. Sarah Shannon et al., Growth in the U.S. Ex-felon and Ex-prisoner Population, 1948-
2010, POPULATION ASS’N OF AM., http://paa2011.princeton.edu/papers/111687 (last visited
Feb. 10, 2016).
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have a criminal record.11 These records—whether for felony offenses, mis-
demeanors, or arrests without conviction (non-conviction records)—are
easily accessible by landlords, employers, and government officials through
inexpensive criminal background checks.12 Even pre-trial records have
been shown to negatively impact hiring decisions, the granting of state
licensure, and access to essential goods and services.13 Many more are
counted among the ranks of those supervised through the more than 3,500
specialized courts that offer alternative mandatory treatment programs in
lieu of incarceration, such as drug and mental health courts, domestic vio-
lence treatment, and mandated domestic violence programs.14 Further-
more, websites posting the mug shots of pretrial detainees accused of
offenses, ranging from sexual assault and murder to failure to pay child
support and public urination, raise important questions about the privacy
rights of the criminalized poor,15 while criminal justice contact has been
shown to have deleterious implications on the health and well-being of the
partners, children, and neighbors of incarcerated and formerly incarcerated
people.16 In sum, a full third of all U.S. adults are subject to some form of
11. HALF IN TEN & THE SENTENCING PROJECT, AMERICANS WITH CRIMINAL
RECORDS 1, http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/cc_HiT_CriminalRecords_
profile_1.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2016).
12. See Christopher Uggen et al., The Edge of Stigma: An Experimental Audit of the Effects of
Low-Level Criminal Records on Employment, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 627, 628 (2014).
13. See id.; see also Paula Marutto & Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Expanding Punishment through
the Disclosure of Non-Conviction Records in Police Background Checks (2015) (presented at the Ameri-
can Society of Criminology Annual Conference).
14. See West Huddleston and Douglas B. Marlowe, Painting the Current Picture: A National
Report on Drug Courts and Other Problem-Solving Court Programs in the United States, NAT’L DRUG
COURT INST. 37 (July 2011), http://www.ndci.org/sites/default/files/nadcp/PCP%20Report%
20FINAL.pdf. For a discussion of the broader implications of the emergence of these kinds of
community programs, see Reuben Miller & Gwendolyn Purifoye, Carceral Devolution and the
Transformation of Urban America, in THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR IN PRISONS ENCOURAGING IN-
STITUTIONAL AND PERSONAL CHANGE (Laura Abrams, Emma Hughes, Michelle Inderbitzin &
Rosie Meek, eds.) (forthcoming 2016).
15. Many state and federal agencies provide data on parents with outstanding child sup-
port obligations. For example, the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services Divi-
sion of Child Support Enforcement posts photographs of parents with child support delinquency
along with the amount of support they are presumed to owe on the website www.deadbeatsilli-
nois.com. Clicking on the pictures of “deadbeat” parents allows you to access their last known
address, a description of their appearance, the last child support payment they submitted, and the
number of children they have. See id. Like state agencies posting pictures of parents with delin-
quent child support payments, commercial mug shot websites have emerged, posting booking
photographs of detainees after their arrests, some of which charge fees for their removal. Mug
Shots and Booking Photo Websites, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 11, 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/mug-shots-
and-booking-photo-websites.aspx.
16. SARAH WAKEFIELD & CHRISTOPHER WILDEMAN, CHILDREN OF THE PRISON
BOOM: MASS INCARCERATION AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INEQUALITY (2013) (discussing
the impact of mass incarceration on prisoners’ children); see also Sampson & Lloeffler, supra note
7, at 29 (discussing the feedback loop between incarceration and concentrated disadvantage);
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criminal justice supervision, rendering them vulnerable to legal and extra-
legal forms of exclusion, stigma, and formal and informal sanctions.17
Contemplating what life must be like under the conditions of
carceral expansion, punishment and society scholars have reimagined the
era of mass incarceration as an age of “mass supervision.”18 Criminologists
Fergus McNeill and Kristen Beyens have described mass supervision as the
set of legal sanctions used to manage formerly incarcerated people in their
home communities.19 Attending to the explosion of probation services in
the United States, sociologist Michelle Phelps has described similar, do-
mestic phenomena as mass probation or mass penal control, pushing the
field to reconsider “the scale and form of criminal justice supervision states
employ.”20 This work reveals how post-incarceration management strate-
gies widen the net of the prison and introduce new regimes of control,
while identifying and disentangling the after effects of post-release correc-
tional supervision from that of imprisonment itself. These studies give the
careful scholar a framework to better understand how legal subjects are
managed after their sentences through formal criminal justice actors and
agencies.
Advancing and considerably expanding this work on the post-incar-
ceration experience, we lay bare the stakes of carceral expansion, asking,
“What do these new modes of supervision, punishment and control pro-
duce?” Attending to the legal and extralegal sanctions imposed on the
criminalized poor, their families, and the communities to which they re-
turn; the host of actors administering such sanctions; and the outcomes
produced through legal exclusion and stigma, we find that carceral expan-
sion has in part produced a new form of citizenship for the Black and
Brown poor—what we refer to as carceral citizenship.
In the sections that follow, we trace the contours of carceral citizen-
ship, identifying the experiences and outcomes of the criminal justice sys-
tem’s target population. Following Wacquant,21 we examine the
mechanisms that uniquely mark carceral citizens for selection, sorting
them for criminal justice processing by class, race, and geography. We then
MEGAN COMFORT, DOING TIME TOGETHER: LOVE AND FAMILY IN THE SHADOW OF THE
PRISON (2009) (discussing incarceration’s impact on family and community members).
17. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, AMERICANS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS: POVERTY
AND OPPORTUNITY PROFILE 1 (2015), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
cc_HiT_CriminalRecords_profile_1.pdf.
18. See Fergus McNeill & Kristel Beyens, Introduction: Studying Mass Supervision, in OF-
FENDER SUPERVISION IN EUROPE 3 (Fergus McNeill & Kristel Beyens eds., 2013) (focusing on
former prisoners in continental Europe).
19. Id.
20. Michelle Phelps, Mass Probation: Toward a More Robust Theory of State Variation in Pun-
ishment 3 (Minn. Population Ctr., Working Paper No. 2014-4), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2476051.
21. Loı̈c Wacquant, Class, Race & Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, 139 DAEDALUS
74, 74 (2010).
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examine the role that third parties, including service providers, the uni-
verse of organizational and institutional resources marshaled to manage
them, and prisoners’ families play in the supervision of this population.
After raising questions about the tenuous ground upon which these
processes of legal exclusion rest, given that the mere accusation of guilt
(i.e., arrest without conviction) draws an increasingly large population of
largely Black and Brown people into this alternate citizenship category, we
conclude with a discussion of its broader implications.
I. ON CARCERAL CITIZENSHIP
In an essay on carceral citizenship and global apartheid, critical geog-
rapher Jenna Lloyd writes:
Black and Latino communities (particularly, though not exclu-
sively) live with the burden of a vast system of criminalization,
policing, and carceral immobilization . . . . The power of
criminalization does not necessarily strip citizenship to the
point of statelessness (as was Arendt’s concern), but it does strip
and differentiate rights among citizens.22
Advancing Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s racial formation theory,23
Loyd exhibits how the creation, embodiment, transformation, and de-
struction of racial categories occur at the regional level through U.S. im-
migration policy, using Haiti as a case study. Loyd’s work demonstrates
how “criminalization . . . serves as a means to rationalize the repressive
restructuring of the social welfare state, stripping entitlements from unde-
serving citizens.”24
Extending but modifying this analytic, we argue that U.S. crime
control policies have produced a novel form of citizenship in the carceral
age based on the presumption that one has committed a crime. Thus, while
the Fourteenth Amendment defines citizenship as “[a]ll persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,”25
carceral citizenship is an alternate citizenship track unique to the largely
raced and gendered targets of the criminal justice system who are marked
by a criminal record. We find that constraints on the participation of the
criminalized poor in the political economy and social life of the spaces in
which they live are not based on any combination of, or any one protected
legal status. That is, their exclusion from education, public welfare, social
22. Jenna M. Loyd, Carceral Citizenship in an Age of Global Apartheid, OCCASION: RACE
SPACE SCALE 1, 5 (2015), http://arcade.stanford.edu/occasion/carceral-citizenship-age-global-
apartheid.
23. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S, at 55 (2d ed. 1994).
24. Loyd, supra note 22, at 5.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
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services, and the housing and labor market is not based on their race, gen-
der, ability, or any other axis of difference recognized by the U.S. legal
system as a protected social category.
Folk notions of race presume ancestry.26 Racism, or “the theory and
practice of applying a social, civic, or legal double standard based on ances-
try, and . . . the ideology surrounding [that] double standard,” rests on
similar presumptions.27 Carceral citizenship, however, rests on a presump-
tion of action—in this case the presumption that one has broken a law.
Therefore, while carceral citizenship interacts with race, and other axes of
difference like class and gender in obvious ways,28 it is not simply one new
form of racial domination built in the image of slavery, or a racial project
that produces a new racial category. Carceral citizenship is instead a novel
social arrangement produced by crime control practices born in the era of mass
incarceration and its community analogue, mass supervision. Unlike citi-
zenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, which is based on ancestry
(via birthright), it is a new form of citizenship based on the presumed
actions of its class. Differential treatment of the carceral citizen is therefore
based solely on his or her status as a legal offender, or someone who has
been presumed to have broken a law,29 and is arguably constitutionally
justified.30
The carceral citizen is not a second-class citizen in a traditional sense.
Carceral citizenship does not engender a constitutional contradiction,
where one’s citizenship rights are not enforced, and he or she may there-
fore invoke protections from the state based on their right to full social,
civic and economic participation. Rather, the carceral citizen has unique
rights, responsibilities, and claims that he or she is permitted to make on
the state. The carceral citizen, then, does not inhabit a racial category (a
26. We refer to race, as it is operationalized in the United States, following the historian
and sociologist duo Barbara and Karen Fields. See BARBARA FIELDS & KAREN FIELDS,
RACECRAFT: THE SOUL OF AMERICAN INEQUALITY (2012), for an in-depth discussion of how
race is marshaled to explain the social conditions and treatment of groups.
27. Id. at 25-26.
28. Hedwig Lee et al., Racial Inequalities in Connectedness to Imprisoned Individuals in the
United States, DU BOIS REVIEW: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON RACE 269, 271 (2015).
29. Presumption is important here and is central to our analysis. The findings from inves-
tigations conducted by the network of attorneys and legal scholars working on the National
Registry of Exonerations show that there have been more than 1,700 exonerations since 1989.
See Summary View, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2016). One could (and arguably should) read
this as meaning that even when convicted, guilt is a presumption.
30. While the Fourteenth Amendment states, “No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” it continues,
“nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV §1 (emphasis added). The Thirteenth Amendment similarly states,
“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdic-
tion.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIII §1  (emphasis added).
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category based on perceived ancestry) but an alternate citizenship track and
a novel form of citizenship. This is an important distinction. The carceral
citizen experiences social, political, and economic life in ways that are
unique to members of his or her class, and are not typically shared by even
the most marginalized people who have traditionally been marked by their
race, religion, ethnicity, or gender. Indeed, the carceral citizen is a novel
legal and social category that has emerged in the age of mass incarceration.
Carceral citizens face constitutionally justified forms of exclusion based
solely on the presumption of legal guilt at some point in their lifetimes.
This peculiar social arrangement has resulted from three key
processes that operate in formal and informal ways. First, the circulation of
people between confinement and disadvantaged communities exacerbate
already existing social inequalities, signaling greater police presence and the
repeated cycle of arrest and incarceration.31 Second, the mark of a criminal
record constrains the mobility of the criminalized poor, activating third
parties in their management and exclusion.32 Third, “[s]hifts in social
welfare and criminal justice policy have at once hollowed out rehabilitative
services and expanded the reach of the state, ensuring that former prison-
ers’ family and friendship networks are the resource of first and last resort
in their transition from prison back home.”33
II. PUTTING MASS SUPERVISION IN ITS PLACE
Carceral expansion has been theorized as an instrument of domina-
tion that promotes inequality across class and racial strata34 and as a geo-
graphic solution used to address social problems.35 The prison, along with
its corollary institutions of surveillance and control, have been viewed as a
relatively unified form of poverty governance,36 producing particular ways
31. Reuben J. Miller, Devolving the Carceral State: Race, Prisoner Reentry, and the Micro-
Politics of Urban Poverty Management, 16 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 305, 312 (2014); see also Jamie
Peck & Nik Theodore, Carceral Chicago: Making the Ex-offender Employability Crisis, 32 INT’L J.
URB. & REGIONAL RES. 251, 257-58 (2008).
32. Reuben J. Miller, Janice Williams Miller, Jelena Zeleskov Djoric & Desmond Patton,
Baldwin’s Mill Race, Punishment, and the Pedagogy of Repression, 1965–2015, 39 HUMAN. & SOC’Y
456, 462 (2015).
33. LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SO-
CIAL INSECURITY 59 (2009); see also id.
34. Angela Davis, Masked Racism: Reflections on the Prison Industrial Complex, 1 COLOR
LINES 11 (1998).
35. RUTH WILSON GLMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSI-
TION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 11 (2006).
36. See Loı̈c Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, 3 PUN-
ISHMENT & SOC’Y 95, 97-98 (2001); WACQUANT, supra note 33; Katherine Beckett & Bruce
Western, Governing Social Marginality Welfare, Incarceration, and the Transformation of State Policy, 3
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 43, 44 (2001).
298 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 21:291
of being in the social world,37 and a regulatory valve, disciplining low-
wage workers. Wacquant finds that these processes render poor, unskilled
Black laborers “redundant” through social exclusion, a changing political
economy, and the state’s abdication of responsibility for their social and
economic outcomes.38 Unskilled Black men are therefore the most “suita-
ble targets” for criminal justice intervention, selected first by class, second
by race, and third by geography.39 Wacquant’s thesis is compelling. More
than two-thirds of former prisoners live at or below half of the U.S. pov-
erty line,40 with 80 percent qualifying as indigent for the purposes of legal
representation.41 The Black imprisonment rate is roughly six times that of
Whites42 and, when incarcerated, Blacks serve lengthier sentences.43 Fur-
thermore, states with stingier welfare expenditures typically have higher
rates of incarceration.44 Noting these trends, Wacquant admonishes schol-
ars to “reconnect social and penal policies” in order to “grasp the new
politics of marginality.”45
The outcomes associated with these “new politics” are jarring. Peo-
ple in prison are overwhelmingly poor.46 Half are estimated to have a
diagnosable mental health issue.47 A recent study found that former pris-
oners are 129 times more likely to die of a drug overdose and twelve times
more likely to die of any other cause within just two weeks of their release
than members of the general population.48
37. See MICHAEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
38. Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis, supra note 36, at 97.
39. Loı̈c Wacquant, Class, Race, and Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, 28 SOCIALISM
AND DEMOCRACY 35, 78 (2010).
40. WACQUANT, supra note 33, at 70.
41. Steven K. Smith & Carol J. DeFrances, Indigent Defense, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 1, 4
(1996).
42. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PREVALENCE OF IMPRIS-
ONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001, at 1 (2003), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf.
43. M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 6 J.
POL. ECON. 1320, 1329 (2014).
44. Beckett & Western, supra note 36, at 44-45.
45. Loı̈c Wacquant, The Wedding of Workfare and Prisonfare in the 21st Century, 16 J. OF
POVERTY 236, 237 (2012).
46. WACQUANT, supra note 33, at 70; see also Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Prisons of
Poverty: Uncovering the Pre-incarceration Incomes of the Imprisoned, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (July
9, 2015), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html (analyzing Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics data to find that, in 2014, incarcerated people had a median annual income of $19,185 prior
to their incarceration, which is 41 percent less than non-incarcerated people of similar ages).
47. Doris J. James & Lauren E. Glaze, Mental Health Problems of Prison and Jail Inmates:
Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFF. OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS 1
(2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.
48. Dora M. Dumont et al., Public Health and the Epidemic of Incarceration, 33 ANN. REV.
OF PUB. HEALTH 325, 331 (2012).
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Straining federal, state, and county budgets,49 mass incarceration ex-
tends a host of burdens to entire communities due to heightened rates of
unemployment,50 the loss of wages,51 family disruption,52 and the in-
creased risk for health and mental health problems associated with impris-
onment.53 For example, sociologist and demographer Evelyn Patterson’s
recent study shows that for every year an inmate serves in prison he or she
loses up to two years of life expectancy.54 Further complicating matters,
former prisoners are released into notoriously disadvantaged spaces, and
particularly into the so-called inner city.55 For example, Paul Street’s study
of the effects of mass incarceration on poor communities in Chicago re-
vealed that the neighborhoods where the highest concentration of arrests
took place were nearly identical to the neighborhoods where most prison-
ers returned.56 Criminologists and urban sociologists have found similar
trends in large cities across the nation.57
These spaces, which service providers refer to as “receiving commu-
nities,”58 are either the few places willing to host former prisoners when
they return, or they simply lack the political power to resist the return of
prisoners to their already disadvantaged spaces. Either way, in states like
Michigan, where the prison population exceeds 45,000, nearly one-third
of all prisoners are arrested from and returned to eight disadvantaged zip
codes, all of which are within the Detroit city limits.59 This is despite the
city representing just seven percent of the state’s population.60 In Illinois,
49. JOHN SCHMITT, KRIS WARNER & SARIKA GUPTA, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES.,
THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION 1, 10 (2010).
50. BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 108-130 (Russell
Sage Foundation, 1st ed. 2006); see also Sara Wakefield & Christopher Uggen, Incarceration and
Stratification, 36 ANN REV. OF SOC. 387 (2010).
51. B. Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social Inequality, 139 DAEDALUS 8, 12-13
(2010).
52. Michael Massoglia, Brianna Remster & Ryan D. King, Stigma or Separation?: Under-
standing the Incarceration-Divorce Relationship, 90 SOC. FORCES 133, 134 (2011).
53. Dumont et al., supra note 48, at 329.
54. Evelyn J. Patterson, The Dose-Response of Time Served in Prison on Mortality: New York
State, 1989-2003, 103 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 523, 526 (2013).
55. Miller et al., supra note 32; see also Sampson & Lloeffler, supra note 7, at 29.
56. Street, supra note 7.
57. Sampson & Lloeffler, supra note 7, at 29; JEREMY TRAVIS, BRUCE WESTERN &
STEVE REDDBURN, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 283, 287 (2014).
58. See Peck & Theodore, supra note 31, at 254.
59. Amy L. Solomon, Gillian L. Thomson & Sinead Keegan, Prisoner Reentry in Michigan,
URB. INST., vi-vii, 34 (2004), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-
pdfs/411172-Prisoner-Reentry-in-Michigan.pdf.
60. QuickFacts: Detroit city, Michigan, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/table/PST045215/2622000 (last visited Mar. 9, 2016) (estimating the Detroit popula-
tion to be 680,250 as of July 1, 2014); QuickFacts: Michigan, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www
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where roughly 35,000 prisoners are annually discharged, more than half
return to Chicago and more than a third return to just six of seventy-seven
Chicago community areas.61 Mirroring national trends, these neighbor-
hoods have poverty, crime, and unemployment rates at three times the
national average. Black people comprise no less than 90 percent of these
neighborhoods, save two, where 90 percent of the residents were Black or
Latino.62 Similar trends can be found in most large cities.
Even the universe of human service agencies tasked with addressing
former prisoners needs—prisoner reentry programs in criminal justice par-
lance—are overwhelmingly located in these neighborhoods.63 As a result,
prisoners are now arrested from, returned to, and provided rehabilitation
services all within the low-rent districts they learn to call home.64 While
one could claim this phenomenon simply scratches an itch—that is, pro-
gramming is located in areas with great need—this social arrangement
raises important questions about the containment of the criminalized poor
in disadvantaged, largely urban spaces. Furthermore, the proliferation of
reentry programming as the rehabilitative strategy of choice in the current
age implicates the loose networks of public and private welfare state actors
and organizations in the management and control of the criminalized
poor. While these more interventionist, community-based behavioral
management strategies speak to how a new series of actors and institutions
have emerged to manage the carceral citizen, urban policing practices
speak most clearly to how this group is sorted for criminal justice selection.
III. POLICING SUITABLE TARGETS
Racial disparities in arrest and incarceration are staggering. A recent
study estimating arrest rates of Black and White youth found that 49 per-
cent of Black men will be arrested for a non-traffic violation by their 23rd
birthday, compared with 38 percent of White men.65 A look across age
categories reveals that Blacks are twice as likely to be arrested as Whites66
and remain six times more likely to be incarcerated.67 Policing research has
consistently supported these findings and provides evidence of one mecha-
.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/26 (last visited Mar. 9, 2016) (estimating the Michigan
population to be 9,922,576 as of July 1, 2015).
61. Nancy G. La Vigne et al., A Portrait of Prisoner Reentry in Illinois, URB. INST. RES.
REP. 1, 51 (2003), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/410662-
A-Portrait-of-Prisoner-Reentry-in-Illinois.pdf.
62. Miller, supra note 31, at 314.
63. Id. at 312, 314.
64. Id.
65. Robert Brame et al., Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest Prevalence by Ages 18 and
23, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 471 (2014).
66. Uniform Crime Reports, Table 43a-c, FBI (2013), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/
ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-43.
67. BONCZAR, supra note 42.
SPRING 2016] The Price of Carceral Citizenship 301
nism that explains them. Blacks and Latinos are stopped, frisked, and ar-
rested at much higher rates than Whites, although they represent a smaller
share of the general population and are less likely to have weapons when
searched.68 This pattern persists even when controlling for suspects’ actual
involvement in the crimes for which they were questioned69 or for crime
rates in the areas where they were stopped.70 Put differently, racial dispari-
ties in street-level criminal justice contact remain even when controlling
for the guilt of the presumed offender, the racial descriptors used by crime
victims to relay who committed actual crimes, or the recent history of
crimes committed by members of their presumed racial group in the given
area. At the same time, law enforcement practices like “hot-spot”71 and
“order maintenance”72 policing ensure the concentration of police in
poor, racialized spaces. Thus, the kinds of crimes associated with the over-
whelmingly poor people that cycle in and out of jails and lockup facilities,
like drug use, public urination, and trespassing, are met by arrests, fines,
court fees, and eventual incarcerations, perpetuating these trends.
Arrest records and misdemeanor offenses alone are enough for some
employers, government officials, and landlords to exclude the accused from
68. Editorial, Racial Discrimination in Stop and Frisk, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/opinion/racial-discrimination-in-stop-and-frisk.html?_r=0.
69. See generally Richard J. Lundman & Robert L. Kaufman, Driving While Black: Effects of
Race, Ethnicity, and Gender on Citizen Self-Reports of Traffic Stops and Police Actions, 41 CRIMINOL-
OGY 195 (2003) (examining self-reports of drivers stopped by police officers and finding that
Blacks and Latinos were not only disproportionately stopped but also were less likely than Whites
to view the stops as legitimate or the officers who stopped them as acting properly); Sharad Goel,
Justin M. Rao & Ravi Shroff, Precinct or Prejudice: Understanding Racial Disparities in New York
City’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy (2015), https://5harad.com/papers/frisky.pdf (estimating the likeli-
hood that suspects were stopped in New York City due to reasonable officer suspicion that the
suspect had a weapon and finding in 44 percent of stops that roughly 1 percent of suspects had a
weapon and that Blacks and Latinos were disproportionately represented among these “low hit”
stops); N.Y. TIMES, supra note 68.
70. See Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City Police
Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT.
ASS’N 813, 813 (2007) (analyzing data from 125,000 pedestrian stops in New York City and
finding that Blacks and Latinos were more likely to be stopped by police than Whites, even when
controlling for racial differences in crime participation in the areas in which the stops occurred).
71. John E. Eck et al., Mapping Crime: Understanding Hot Spots, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE 1,
2 (2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/209393.pdf (“Though no common definition of
the term hot spot of crime exists, the common understanding is that a hot spot is an area that has
a greater than average number of criminal or disorder events, or an area where people have a
higher than average risk of victimization.”).
72. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Concep-
tion of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-maintenance Policing New York Style, 97
MICH. L. R. 291, 301 (1998). Harcourt defines order maintenance policing as “a law-enforce-
ment strategy that seeks to create public order by aggressively enforcing laws against public
drunkenness, loitering, vandalism, littering, public urination, panhandling, prostitution, and
other minor misdemeanors.” Id.
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jobs, housing, and government licensure.73 The collateral consequences of
a felony conviction are all the more severe, excluding former prisoners
from meaningful participation in social, civic, and economic life.74 The
long-term effects of imprisonment on poor racial and ethnic minorities
cannot be overstated. It is by now well known that Blacks and Latinos, at
just 30 percent of the U.S. population, represent nearly 60 percent of the
nation’s prisoners.75 Subsequently, they disproportionately shoulder the
burdens associated with imprisonment, which range from chronic unem-
ployment and near-intractable poverty, to housing instability and poor
health and mental health care access.76 If imprisonment rates were held
constant, nearly one in three Black men born after 2001 would spend
some time in jail or prison, along with one in eighteen Black women—
about five times the rate of similarly situated Whites.77 More insidious,
incarceration’s spillover effects extend well beyond the suspected “legal of-
fender,”78 affecting their partners, children, and extended family mem-
bers.79 Indeed, 44 percent of Black women and 32 percent of Black men
have a family member who has been incarcerated,80 while one in nine
Black children has an incarcerated parent,81 extending disadvantage across
generations.
73. Marutto, supra note 13; Uggen, supra note 12.
74. Commerce, Justice, Sci., and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2010: Hearings Before a
H.R. Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong. 405-06 (2009) (statement of Jeremy
Travis, President, John Jay College of Criminal Justice).
75. LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERINN J. HABERMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COR-
RECTIONS: KEY FACTS AT A GLANCE (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus12
.pdf.
76. Devah Pager, et al., Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers to Employment Facing Young Black
and White Men with Criminal Records, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 195, 199 (2009)
(“Two key findings emerge from the audit results. First, as in earlier research, a criminal record
has a significant negative impact on hiring outcomes, even for applicants with otherwise appeal-
ing characteristics. Across teams, a criminal record reduces the likelihood of a callback or job
offer by nearly 50 percent (28 vs. 15 percent). Second, the negative effect of a criminal convic-
tion is substantially larger for blacks than for whites. As shown in Figure 1, the magnitude of the
criminal record penalty suffered by black applicants (60 percent) is roughly double the size of the
penalty for whites with a record (30 percent). This interaction between race and criminal record
is large and statistically significant, which indicates that the penalty of a criminal record is more
disabling for black job seekers than whites.”); Dumont et al., supra note 48, at 327-31; see also
JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY (2003);
TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES DISAD-
VANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007); ERNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS:
THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2006).
77. BONCZAR, supra note 42.
78. Megan Comfort, Punishment Beyond the Legal Offender, 3 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI.
271, 272 (2007).
79. WAKEFIELD & WILDEMAN, supra note 16.
80. Lee et al., supra note 28.
81. WAKEFIELD & WILDEMAN, supra note 16, at 32.
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Carceral expansion has therefore facilitated the emergence of an im-
poverished, racialized, and denigrated social category that is both materi-
ally and symbolically stranded. This is in part due to shifting trends in
liability law, making the owner, employer, or state agency responsible for
the conduct of those whom they house, employ, or license.82 It is also
likely facilitated by the emergence and proliferation of inexpensive crimi-
nal background checks83 and public expectations that responsible stake-
holders will access criminal records and withhold access to the
criminalized poor.84 For whatever reasons these practices exist, once ar-
rested, this group becomes subject to legal practices that exclude them
from full social, civic, and economic participation. The concentration of
criminal justice resources in poor inner-city communities, coupled with
the propensity of police officers to stop, frisk, and arrest Black and Brown
residents, ensure that the people subject to these forms of exclusion are
disproportionately poor Black and Brown people.
IV. ON RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY
Given the consequences associated with having a criminal record,
carceral expansion has produced a jobless, maligned, and socially excluded
class subject to the vagaries of a flexible economy, the retrenchment of
social welfare benefits, and the volatility of the low-wage labor market.85 A
recent report from the American Bar Foundation revealed that nearly
45,000 laws restrict former prisoners’ mobility.86 The domain of these
policies range from limiting the franchise to diminishing access to housing,
food, employment, and education.87 These legal restrictions dictate where
former prisoners can live, what kinds of occupations they can take up, and
with whom they can associate.88 Further complicating matters, there are
nowhere near the community resources needed to adequately address the
challenges former prisoners face during reentry.89
Limited availability of treatment, housing, employment, and mental
health services facilitates the reliance of former prisoners on already vul-
82. See David Thacher, The Rise of Criminal Background Screening in Rental Housing, 33
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 5 (2008).
83. Uggen, supra note 12, at 628.
84. Thacher, supra note 82, at 10.
85. WACQUANT, supra note 33, at 140.
86. Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and the Problem of Over-Criminalization of
Federal Law: Hearing Before the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary Task Force on Over-Criminalization,
113th Cong. 15 (2014) (testimony of Mathias H., Heck, Jr. on behalf of the A.B.A.).
87. Id. at 23.
88. Id. at 21.
89. See Faye S. Taxman, Matthew L. Perdoni & Lana D. Harrison, Drug Treatment Services
for Adult Offenders: The State of the State, 32 J.  SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 239 (2007).
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nerable networks of care.90 Prisoners’ families are thereby made responsi-
ble to support them as they attempt to become integrated in their home
communities.91 At the same time, their exclusion from welfare benefits,
sustainable labor, housing, and education render their personal networks as
the primary mechanism of their rehabilitation, a role the state once at least
rhetorically played.92 When the state does fund rehabilitative programs, it
does so through contracts with private nonprofit, community-based
vendors.93
Despite increasing in number during the age of mass supervision,
there are not enough community-based prisoner reentry programs to ad-
dress returning prisoners’ needs.94 Thus, the state—represented by correc-
tions officers, the police, and the courts—has off-loaded its capacity to
respond to the needs of former prisoners onto the actors least able to do
so. This support network consists of other former prisoners, their families,
their community members, and the human services agencies that attempt
to address social problems associated with incarceration through social ser-
vice provision. As a result, the rehabilitation of prisoners “has been out-
sourced and privatized, moving from within prison walls into the . . .
church basements . . . and community centers” of the post-industrial
city.95
Reentry service providers—some of whom are contracted through
the state, but most of whom operate within a private, nonprofit organiza-
tion—now serve the public function of supervising, monitoring, and ad-
dressing the needs of former prisoners.96 Given their limited capacity to
take on the largely structural dilemmas former prisoners face, these organi-
zations employ their resources to take on the kinds of problems they can
address—former prisoners’ psychological dispositions, their ability to form
pro-social relationships, and the practical “soft skills” associated with ac-
quiring employment and housing.97 This is accomplished through the em-
ployment of psychosocial skills groups, various cognitive interventions, and
processes of socialization that occur within reentry sites.98 This approach,
commonly referred to as human capital investment, is a community devel-
opment and poverty reduction strategy that seeks to enhance participants’
cognitive skills, such as their ability to resolve conflict in the workplace,
90. See Rebecca L. Naser & Nancy G. La Vigne, Family Support in the Prisoner Re-entry
Process: Expectations and Realities, 43 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 93 (2006).
91. Id.
92. FRANCIS ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND
SOCIAL PURPOSE 14 (1981).
93. See LYNNE HANEY, OFFENDING WOMEN 16 (2010).
94. See Naser & La Vigne, supra note 90.
95. Miller, supra note 31, at 308.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 315.
98. See La Vigne et al., supra note 61, at 151.
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and their non-cognitive skills, like their mental toughness, trustworthiness,
and grit to ameliorate social problems like poverty, unemployment, com-
munity violence, and housing insecurity by enhancing the skill sets of
people.99
While these strategies have been linked with increases in former pris-
oners’ self esteem and general sense of agency,100 which are outcomes as-
sociated with criminal desistance,101 the processes of legal and extralegal
exclusion that former prisoners encounter largely occur outside the juris-
diction of the reentry program. Human capital interventions can neither
remove criminal stigma nor change former prisoners’ compromised legal
status. With structural barriers left firmly in place, these interventions
responsibilize former prisoners, making them responsible for social out-
comes largely outside of their control.102 At the same time, changes in
penal policy have resulted in the reduction of rehabilitative programming
offered inside prisons103 and a simultaneous increase in the number of, and
the state’s reliance on, private, nonprofit, community-based reentry pro-
grams in the reintegration of released inmates.104 The reentry program has
therefore taken on the responsibility the state once assumed to ensure the
social, civic, and economic inclusion of prisoners after release, without
ever addressing the underlying conditions that contribute to former pris-
oners’ all too frequent re-arrest, re-incarceration, and repeated return from
jail or prison.105
99. See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALY-
SIS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (3d ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1994); James
Heckman, Doing It Right: Job Training and Education, 135 NATIONAL AFFAIRS 86, 88 (1999);
James Heckman & Yona Rubinstein, The Importance of Noncognitive Skills: Lessons from the GED
Testing Program, 91 THE AM. ECON. REV. 145, 145-49 (2001); Eric Lichtenberger & Scott Wey-
gandt, Offender Workforce Development Services Make an Impact, 73 CORRECTIONS TODAY 66, 66
(2011); Lance Lochner, Education, Work, and Crime: A Human Capital Approach, 45 INT’L ECON.
REV. 811, 811 (2004).
100. Philip Young P. Hong, Dara Lewis & Sanomi Choi, Employment Hope as an Empower-
ment Pathway to Self-Sufficiency Among Ex-offenders, 53 J. OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION 317,
320 (2014).
101. FERGUS MCNEILL ET AL., INST. OF RES. & INNOVATION TO SOC. SERV., HOW AND
WHY PEOPLE STOP OFFENDING: DISCOVERY DESISTANCE 2 (2012) (providing evidence sum-
mary to support social services in Scotland).
102. See Mona Lynch, Rehabilitation As Rhetoric: The Ideal of Reformation in Contemporary
Parole Discourse and Practices, 2 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 40, 53 (2000).
103. See Michelle S. Phelps, Rehabilitation in the Punitive Era: The Gap Between Rhetoric and
Reality in U.S. Prison Programs, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 33, 34 (2011).
104. See Miller et al., supra note 32, at 460.
105. See id.
306 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 21:291
V. OF PENOLOGICAL INTERESTS AND VARIED STAKES
A clear legal framework governs the power of wardens to punish and
surveil people while they are incarcerated.106 This framework derives in
part from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wolff v. McDonnell, where
the Court found that “[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Con-
stitution and the prisons of this country.”107 The Wolff decision, write
scholars Michael B. Mushlin and Naomi Rosyln Galtz, “aided by the in-
flux of lawyers to the field of civil rights enforcement, unleashed litigation
that helped, among other things, to improve prison medical care, remedy
horrendous overcrowding, and increase professionalism in prison adminis-
tration.”108 Among the rights noted in Wolff, prisoners retained the rights
to religious freedom, to access the courts and legal counsel, to protections
against racial discrimination, and to due process.109
In Procunier v. Martinez, the Supreme Court described governmental
interests as “the preservation of internal order and discipline, the mainte-
nance of institutional security against escape or unauthorized entry, and
the rehabilitation of the prisoners.”110 The Court later drew upon this
definition in Turner v. Safley when it held that prison administrators may
create a regulation that impinges on a prisoner’s constitutional rights, so
long as it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.111 Sur-
veying Court decisions in Turner’s wake, Mushlin and Galtz describe how
penological interests have been used to deny prisoners’ rights that would
be considered constitutional violations were the defendants not prison-
ers.112 They explain that “the Court has held under Turner that inmates
can be medicated against their will, their publications censored, and family
visits suspended for years at a stretch.”113
106. In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), the U.S. Supreme Court held that admin-
istrative policies may infringe upon the constitutional rights of people in prison, so long as the
policies or regulations serve a legitimate penological interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89
(1987) (“[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is
valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”). This gives prison wardens
and corrections officials wide latitude in determining all details of a person’s daily life while they
are incarcerated, including their communications, visits, possessions, and activities. See, e.g.,
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003) (upholding Michigan Department of Correc-
tions’ ban on visits from minor nieces and nephews because the regulations bear a rational rela-
tion to legitimate penological interests).
107. 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
108. Michael B. Mushlin & Naomi Roslyn Galtz, Getting Real About Race and Prisoner
Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 27, 32 (2009).
109. 418 U.S. at 556.
110. 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974).
111. 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
112. Mushlin & Galtz, supra note 108, at 33.
113. Id. at 33 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990), Thornburgh v.
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404 (1989), and Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 137 (2003)).
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Wardens have control over the movement of those in state custody,
and wardens are among the final arbiters of the rights they may access, the
goods and services they receive while in custody, and the outcomes of the
grievances they file for reparation. Upon reentry, a web of third-party ac-
tors replaces the prison warden with varied stakes in the health and well-
being of the formerly incarcerated and their access to goods and services.
We conceptualize these third parties as the loose network of employers,
landlords, social service providers, local officials administering state licen-
sure, social service providers, and the families and friends of the formerly
incarcerated.114 Due to the thousands of laws and ordinances that allow for
the legal exclusion of formerly incarcerated people from certain types of
employment, subsidized housing, state licensure, education, and public
welfare services,115 third-party actors have inordinate power over the so-
cial, civic, and economic mobility of people with criminal records.
While parole officers, social service providers, employers, landlords,
and family members hold inordinate power over the fate of the carceral
citizen, each has very different stakes in that person’s future—and in the
prospect of his return to prison. If a tenant goes back to prison, the land-
lord can find another renter to take his place. Parole officers and social
workers have large caseloads and often have little time or capacity to be-
come invested in the success of a particular returning citizen.116 For these
third parties, the stakes are relatively low when they exercise their discre-
tion to report behavior—or suspected behavior—to a parole officer or a
judge.
While third-party reentry organizations serve the public function of
supervising and monitoring formerly incarcerated people, they are largely
comprised of private actors with contractual relationships with the state.117
Thus, the relationship between the carceral citizen and third-party non-
profit agencies is framed as one between service provider and client or
consumer.118 An agency’s relationship with individual returning citizens is
114. Miller et al., supra note 32, at 463.
115. Heck, supra note 86, at 2-3, 5, 7, 9.
116. See Faith Lutze, Professional Lives of Community Corrections Officers: The Invisible Side of
Reentry 52 (2013) (“Without knowledge about the offender [due to large caseloads], officers
may find it best to err on the side of caution and sanction an offender because it is easier and less
likely to be criticized if something goes wrong later.”).
117. Miller traces the rise of these partnerships through reforms in criminal justice and
social welfare policy. Described as “carceral devolution,” Miller suggests the emergence and
proliferation of this new social arrangement represents an offloading of carceral authority—in
this case the right and responsibility to rehabilitate offenders—onto community-based actors and
organizations. Miller, supra note 31, at 308. Similarly, sociologist Lynne Haney describes this
practice as “governing from a distance,” and such programs as “carceral satellites,” or private
nonprofit actors contracted through the state do the work of managing inmates and former
inmates in community. HANEY, supra note 93, at 87.
118. See Hugh McLaughlin, What’s in a Name: ‘Client,’ ‘Patient,’ ‘Customer,’ ‘Consumer,’
‘Expert by Experience,’ ‘Service User’—What’s Next?, 39 BRIT. J. SOC. WORK 1101 (2009).
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not governed by a framework of rights or constitutional protections. And
while the nonprofit service agency depends upon the availability of certain
categories of returning citizens to fill its caseloads, it does not require the
continued freedom of any particular individual. In essence, while these
agencies depend upon the existence of clients and caseloads, their stake in
an individual’s successful discharge from parole is low.
It should be noted that social service providers can be held liable for
the actions of their clients should they cause harm to other program re-
sidents or members of their communities.119 For example, Sam Dolnick,
an investigative reporter for the New York Times, wrote a scathing series on
New Jersey’s system of privately run halfway houses, calling for greater
oversight and questioning the ethics of its operation and management.120
More recently, a prominent halfway house in Chicago was sued for $18
million after a convicted sex offender who was receiving services at the
facility absconded from parole and sexually assaulted three women.121
Operating on a shoestring budget, public disregard and lawsuits from
community members threaten the sustainability of a given reentry organi-
zation. Held liable for the actions of their residents, reentry programs are
incentivized to operate in ways that privilege community safety, rather
than the freedoms, rights, and thriving of their clientele. These organiza-
tions, however, are not prisons. When service providers and formerly in-
carcerated program participants are asked about the central mission of
reentry programs, they report, almost without exception, that reentry pro-
grams exist to help their clients “change their lives.”122  This more rehabil-
itative mission does not neatly align with the expectations of public safety
to which they are held accountable.
Even considering the consequences for social service providers
should clients cause harm to themselves or others in a given community,
family members conscripted into the management of returning citizens
have very different stakes. The role that family members play in supporting
returning citizens cannot be overstated. A 2015 study found that
“[r]eentry programs, nonprofits, and faith-based organizations combined
did not provide housing and other support at the levels that families
did.”123 Two-thirds of formerly incarcerated individuals relied on the sup-
119. See, e.g., Steve Schmadeke & Todd Lighty, Cook County Jury Awards $18 Million to
Three Rape Victims, CHI. TRIB. (July 17, 2015, 6:45 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/local/breaking/ct-multimillion-verdict-halfway-house-met-20150716-story.html.
120. Sam Dolnick, As Escapees Stream Out, a Penal Business Thrives, N.Y. TIMES (June 16,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/nyregion/in-new-jersey-halfway-houses-escap-
ees-stream-out-as-a-penal-business-thrives.html.
121. Schmadeke & Lighty, supra note 119.
122. Miller, supra note 31, at 322.
123. SANETA DEVUONO-POWELL, CHRIS SCHWEIDLER, ALICIA WALTERS & AZADEH
ZOHRABI, WHO PAYS? THE TRUE COST OF INCARCERATION ON FAMILIES 9 (2015), http://
ellabakercenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/who-pays.pdf.
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port of family members to find housing after release.124 More than half
lived with family members when they left prison.125 This support may
entail grave costs for family members, including housing insecurity for
family members who wish to live with their formerly incarcerated loved
ones. One in five families report “being evicted or denied housing when
their formerly incarcerated family member returned.”126
Indeed, the regime of carceral citizenship mobilizes, severs, and im-
perils family ties all at once. Family members experience the consequences
of carceral citizenship alongside the person convicted or suspected of a
crime. As one 61-year-old woman told researchers in a 2015 study:
[My son] and I want to live together but he has felony charges
so when we go and get a place even if we put all our money
together, it’s still a struggle. Nobody wants to take somebody
that has a felony. So I’m faced with being homeless, seriously
homeless. At 61! I can’t believe it. I can’t find a place to live in
my own hometown.127
For the families of carceral citizens, their own housing, safety, public bene-
fits, child support payments, childcare options, income, mental health, and
general well-being may be bound up in whether their family member re-
turns to prison.
In the age of mass supervision, regimes of post-incarceration surveil-
lance and ostensible social welfare provision serve to cement the legal ex-
clusions of carceral citizenship. The relationship between a returning
citizen and his or her parole officer, landlord, group counselor, or social
worker is not structured by rights or recourse. These precarious, low stakes
interactions operate alongside the state’s mobilization of kinship networks
to produce a tangled web of welfare provision, surveillance, and punish-
ment. In place of a public social welfare apparatus with clearly defined
entitlements and avenues for redress, carceral expansion has produced a
web of private actors with varied stakes and minimal liabilities.
VI. ON RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITY
Once accused of a crime and deprived of liberty, the accused are
routed into a set of perverse benefits and services unique to their class. For
example, in order to not run afoul of constitutional protections against
cruel and unusual punishment, the state is expected to ensure prisoners
124. Id. at 27; see also Rebecca L. Naser & Christy A. Visher, Family Members’ Experiences
with Incarceration and Reentry, 7 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 20, 20 (2006) (citing studies showing
that more than three-quarters of formerly incarcerated people reside, at least initially, with family
members after release).
125. DEVUONO-POWELL ET AL., supra note 123, at 27.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 26.
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have access to food, water, shelter, and the most basic healthcare.128 While
one may debate the adequacy of such measures, the largest decarceration of
prisons in U.S. history hinged on the claim that California prisons are
overcrowded and provide inadequate health services.129 Justice Kennedy’s
opinion in Brown v. Plata listed violations that included fifty-four prisoners
sharing a toilet, 200 prisoners living in a gymnasium, suicidal prisoners
being locked away for nearly twenty-four hours in cages the size of tele-
phone booths, and a preventable death occurring every six to seven days in
California prisons.130
We have shown that penological interests govern the restriction of
rights. Thus, we are not suggesting that the rights of carceral citizenship
are actually fulfilled in prisons but rather that the avenue for recourse (though
limited and rarely successful) is noteworthy and provides some evidence
that such rights exist. What is perhaps most striking is that the carceral
citizen is the only citizenship class in the United States that can claim a
right to what many may consider basic human needs—food, clothing, and
shelter.
Such entitlements can be found in carceral systems beyond the
prison, and carceral citizenship may operate in both criminal and civil pro-
ceedings. For example, the accusation of child abuse or neglect activates
the universe of child welfare officers, police, and court officials to monitor
and manage a parent accused of being abusive or neglectful of their chil-
dren.131 Whether or not the parent eventually loses her child permanently,
the accusation that she abused or neglected her child routes her into an
alternative citizenship track where she is at once surveilled, monitored, and
managed, and at the same time provided access to goods and services to
which other poor people simply do not have access. For example, when
children are taken from their parents—or, as is disproportionately the case,
when children are taken from poor, Black single mothers132—these par-
ents have a right to access services that may include housing assistance,
treatment of drug and alcohol addiction, bus vouchers, therapy, respite
128. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1924, 1927.
131. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare’s Paradox, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 881, 885
(2007).
132. Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers,
59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1477 (2012); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., AD-
DRESSING RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD WELFARE 3 (2011), https://www.childwel
fare.gov/pubPDFs/racial_disproportionality.pdf#page=1&view=Introduction (The Depart-
ment’s “figures for 1998 through 2008 show a drop in the percentage of African-American
children in foster care, although a large disparity remains when compared with figures for White
children.”).
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care, and parenting classes.133 That is, after their right to parent their chil-
dren is infringed based on an allegation of abuse or neglect, they are able to
access the benefits of carceral citizenship and do not just bear its con-
straints. Legal scholar Dorothy Roberts identified this trade-off in her in-
terviews with Black women in an area of Chicago exposed to high levels
of Department of Children and Family Services involvement. As Roberts
concluded, “The child welfare system exacts an onerous price: it requires
poor mothers to relinquish custody of their children in exchange for state
support needed to care for them.”134
While carceral citizens have an avenue for recourse if the state vio-
lates certain basic rights (an avenue unavailable to other citizens), in prac-
tice wardens, social workers, court officials, and social service providers
deny basic needs at their discretion. The carceral citizen must therefore
interact with the universe of third-party actors who manage their access to
freedom, their interactions with their children, and the essential goods and
services they need to make ends meet, in ways that will be interpreted as
nonthreatening and compliant. This is in part due to the uneven stakes
between third parties and the criminalized poor in their freedom and abil-
ity to navigate the social world. It is also due to the power differential third
parties have under the regime of carceral citizenship. Carceral citizens are
therefore made responsible for acting in ways that manage the perceptions
of others, at the threat of losing access to their freedom, their housing,
their employment, and their families.
CONCLUSION
The practices of legal exclusion outlined in this Article have rendered
the criminalized poor dependent on the goodwill of others, heightening
the stakes of their everyday interactions in ways that are distinct from other
social groups. Because former prisoners have no legal standing to make
claims for protections against the most common forms of discrimination
they face in everyday life, their interactions with the police, the courts,
social service workers, group counselors, landlords, employers, their family
members, and even other former prisoners have life and death conse-
quences. Carceral citizens are excluded from most meaningful forms of
employment.135 They must therefore learn to navigate their social world in
ways that are nonthreatening and allow them access to the scarce resources
available to them. An argument with a family member means the carceral
citizen may have no couch to sleep on. Scarce, intermittent, often under-
133. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PRESERVE OR REUNIFY FAMILIES
AND ACHIEVE PERMANENCY FOR CHILDREN 1-2 (2012), https://www.childwelfare.gov/
pubPDFs/reunify.pdf
134. Roberts, supra note 132, at 893.
135. See MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L EMP’T L.
PROJECT, 65 MILLION “NEED NOT APPLY”: THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL BACK-
GROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 1-2 (2011); see also Pager et al., supra note 76, at 199.
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the-table employment leaves them little money to cover a security deposit
for an apartment, insurance for a car, or a deductible in case of an auto
accident. The geographic restrictions on their mobility, and the expecta-
tion that they will check in frequently with a probation or parole officer
means that it is almost impossible for them to hold down a job and height-
ens the risk of parole revocation should they take one, especially one
outside their receiving community where work is scarce to begin with.
The concentration of police presence in the spaces where carceral
citizens live, work, and have leisure increases the chances that they will be
stopped, frisked, and arrested, and extends police surveillance to members
of their communities. Since having an arrest record justifies legal exclusion,
the very presence of returning prisoners to poor urban and rural neighbor-
hoods acts as justification for further police involvement, extending the
reach of the penal state and its associated disadvantages to their partners,
children, and neighbors.
We have presented the uniqueness of treatment for the criminalized
poor, at the hands of social actors, and the mechanisms through which
they are excluded from full social participation as evidence of an alternate
citizenship track—what we have called carceral citizenship. We have ar-
gued that carceral citizens experience social life in ways that are unique
from other marginalized groups. They are uniquely branded by the mark
of a criminal record and are subject to forms of legal exclusion that would
be unlawful if directed toward other social groups.136 That they have little
legal recourse further substantiates our claim that this is indeed a unique
category of citizenship, based not on presumed ancestry (race), or a pre-
sumed gender classification, but on the presumption of legal guilt. This is
not to say that carceral citizenship does not articulate with race, class, and
gender-based forms of exclusion and domination. Members of this class
are overwhelmingly poor, disproportionately comprised of racial and eth-
nic minorities, and disproportionately male. Difference of almost any kind
is marginalized, over-policed and over-incarcerated in the United States—
the egregious incarceration rates of Black women and the over-representa-
tion and treatment of LGBTQ youth in the juvenile justice system attests
to this.137  However, our central thesis is that the exclusion of carceral
citizens from civil society is based on their status as presumed lawbreakers.
As a result, they have tenuous standing to request protections from the state
to prevent harm or to provide reparations for the harms associated with
their treatment. For example, while half of employers surveyed through
136. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 2 (rev. ed. 2012).
137. See JILL MCCORKEL, BREAKING WOMEN: GENDER, RACE, AND THE NEW POLITICS
OF IMPRISONMENT (2013); JEROME HUNT & AISHA MOODIE-MILLS, CENTER FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS, THE UNFAIR CRIMINALIZATION OF GAY AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH: AN OVER-
VIEW OF THE EXPERIENCES OF LGBT YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2012), https:/
/www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/06/pdf/juvenile_justice.pdf.
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Devah Pager’s now famous audit study suggested they would not consider
hiring an ex-offender, it is within an employer’s right to discriminate
based on an applicant’s criminal record in most states.138 In fact, there is a
tacit expectation that a conscientious employer or landlord will deny appli-
cations from ex-offenders.139 Furthermore, licensing bodies may disqualify
candidates for licensure based solely on their arrest record without fear of
reprisal. While empirical research is needed to validate this claim, we
would argue that this is largely due to such ambiguously defined rules that
bar offenders from licensure, as the “good character” mandates of many
professional associations and the rise of actuarial strategies to contain risk
by excluding high-risk groups.140
It is important to note that the activation of this distinct citizenship
track does not rely on the actual commitment of a criminal act but on its
presumption. The circulation of racialized, impoverished, and criminalized
bodies between some form of confinement and poor urban communities
activates police presence and signals the presumption of guilt in these
spaces. Subsequently, the over policing of the inner city results in the over-
arrest and eventual incarceration of disparate numbers of Black and Brown
people, while extending the cycle of policing, arrest, and exclusion to for-
mer prisoners’ families and community members.
This series of events is all the more problematic given that arrest and
incarceration rates are not neatly linked with crime.141 Furthermore, while
most arrests do not result in conviction,142 and despite limited evidence of
verifiable legal guilt, third parties view arrest records as legal justification
for exclusion from essential goods and services, thereby funneling the
138. See Devah Pager, Two Strikes and You’re Out: The Intensification of Racial and Criminal
Stigma, in BARRIERS TO REENTRY? THE LABOR MARKET FOR RELEASED PRISONERS IN POST-
INDUSTRIALIZED AMERICA 151-73 (Shawn D. Bushway, Michael A. Stoll & David Weiman
eds., 2007).
139. Thacher, supra note 82, at 13.
140. Empirical research has shown that licensing bans and federal and state restrictions ex-
clude people from participating in a range of occupations including driving a taxicab, street
vending, and anything involving the care of children or vulnerable populations. See Amy Meek,
Street Vendors, Taxicabs and Exclusion Zones: The Impact of Collateral Consequences of Criminal Con-
victions at the Local Level, 75 OH. ST. L. J. 1 (2014); Darren Wheelock, Christopher Uggen &
Heather Hlavka, Employment Restrictions for Individuals with Felon Status and Racial Inequality in the
Labor Market, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON RE-ENTRY 283 (Ikponwosa O. Ekunwe & Richard
Statler Jones eds., 2011).
141. Examining the relationship between the increased arrests associated with broken win-
dows policing and crime, legal theorist Bernard Harcourt and economist Jens Ludwig find that
one could not conclude this strategy had a causal impact on crime in New York City. Bernard E.
Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social
Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 277 (2006). They go on to write that “from a public policy
perspective, the faith that many policymakers place in the efficacy of broken windows policing is
in the end just faith, rather than the result of convincing empirical evidence.” Id. at 300.
142. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control without Conviction, 119 AM. J.
SOC. 351, 363 (2013).
314 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 21:291
raced and criminalized poor into what we describe as carceral citizenship.
This alone raises important questions about the extent to which such prac-
tices of legal exclusion are actually triggered by the due process called for
in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Current efforts to reduce the prison population will not address the
conditions associated with carceral citizenship. Due in part to its (lack of)
legal (and ethical) justification, and the multiple domains in which the
processes we have outlined are carried out, its consequences extend across
generations, drawing entire communities into the penal dragnet. Carceral
citizenship therefore has important implications for scholarship on legal
reform, how we understand what those reforms produce, and the role,
force, and consequence of the state in the lives of the poor, and especially
poor people of color in the United States.
